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ABSTRACT 
 
 A study was undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the CF188 main landing 
gear upgrade on reducing Planing Link Mechanism failures.  Two main landing gear 
configurations were studied: the prototype configuration and, for comparison purposes, 
the current configuration referred to as the baseline.  Under this study, the flight test 
data that was analyzed came from key measurements recorded during maintenance 
rigging procedures, pilot ground handling quality ratings, and from over 80 landings at 
different descent rates and aircraft attitudes.  Landings consisted of touch and go, full 
stop, cable overrun and cable engagement.  The aircraft that was used through the 
flight test program had both its main landing gears instrumented.  While the prototype 
configuration had minimal impact on the ground handling characteristics, it 
demonstrated promising results during maintenance activities as well as loads 
distribution during landings.  The prototype was easier to rig which will allow the use of 
tighter limits further standardizing the complex maintenance procedure.  From both a 
static and dynamic point of view, the hold down force was significantly increased.   
Within the scope of this study, it was found that the CF188 main landing gear upgrade 
will reduce Planing Link Mechanism failures.     
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
From the YF-17 to the F/A-18 
 
In the 1970’s, as per Winchester (1) and Crosby (2), the U.S. Air Force had a 
requirement to complement the F-15 Eagle with a more economical, lightweight fighter 
aircraft.  The U.S. Navy also felt the need to replace some of its fleets with a multi-role 
aircraft and to complement the expensive F-14 Tomcat.  As there was already a 
competition for the U.S. Air Force lightweight fighter aircraft, Congress directed that the 
Navy choose one of the contenders, limiting the choice between the Dynamic YF-16 
and the Northrop YF-17.  Both aircraft, initially designed for the U.S. Air Force, needed 
a major redesign to meet the U.S. Navy specific requirements.  Although the U.S. Air 
Force decided to choose the YF-16, the U.S. Navy preferred the two engine competitor 
and decided to go ahead with the Northrop/McDonnell Douglas YF-17 understanding 
that major redesigns would be required to meet carrier takeoff, arrested landings, range 
and other specific U.S. Navy requirements.  The aircraft designation became the      
F/A-18.  The F/A -18 was a larger aircraft than the YF-17 with wet wings, more powerful 
engines, more available space for avionics and most importantly, a widened and 
stronger landing gear to sustain the additional 10,000 lbs, carrier takeoff and arrested 
landings.   
 
Landing Gear Design 
 
During aircraft design, as in Raymer (3), the landing gear usually gives the most 
problems to the designers.  Depending on centre of gravity location, the distance and 
the angle with the tip of the tail, and aircraft weight, the tires and shock absorbers must 
be of a certain size and at a specific location to allow effective takeoff and landings.  In 
addition, if the landing gear is designed to be retracted, the landing gear must retract 
 2 
and fit within the existing structure of the newly designed aircraft.  Very rarely would the 
structure be modified to accommodate the landing gear. 
 
In the case of the F/A-18, the entire landing gear had to be reinforced to sustain 
the added weight from a light fighter aircraft to a medium fighter aircraft the F/A-18 had 
become and to meet the Navy requirements for carrier operations.  The wheel track, as 
defined by the distance between the main landing gear tires, went from 6.83 ft. to 10.2 ft 
(4).  The wheelbase, as defined by the distance from the nose landing gear to the main 
landing gear wheel, only went from 17.2 ft to 17.8 ft.  The increase in landing gear size 
resulted in complications storing the landing gear within the very limited space available 
in the existing structure of the F/A-18.  Basically, during main landing gear retraction, 
the shock absorber now needed to be shrunk and the main wheel had to be rotated 
within a specific angle in order to fit within the wheel well.  As stated in Roskan (5), 
these constitute special problems in gear retraction and generally require additional 
links to be added to the system.  The solution to this problem was the complicated, but  
ingenious Planing Mechanism Assembly (PMA).  The PMA consisted of the connecting 
link, bell crank assembly, planing link, planing arm spring, shrink link and axle lock links.  
A more detailed description is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
Planing Mechanism Assembly Failure  
 
Although the complex PMA allowed the main landing gear to fit within the limited 
wheel well size, other problems quickly surfaced.  The PMA became a weak part of the 
landing gear resulting in regular failures.  PMA failures usually happened upon touch 
down or shortly thereafter, and could occur on either the left or the right main landing 
gear.  In general, PMA failures were associated with buckling of the connecting link or 
the planing link with signs of bell crank assembly contact.  During a failure, the axle lock 
links became unlocked allowing the main wheel to deplane from the landing path 
resulting in a lost of directional control at high speed.  From a pilot perspective, an 
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unlocked axle lock link resulted in a tone and warning light in the cockpit.  With a 
planing link failure tone and warning light, the pilot, if able, was instructed to execute a 
go-around followed by a cable engagement to alleviate the high speed directional 
control problem.  Throughout the years, numerous PMA failures upon landing resulted 
in fatal mishaps, hence the importance in finding a solution to this problem. 
 
Possible factors that may have caused PMA failures included but were not limited 
to: tire pressure and shock absorber servicing, main landing gear rigging during 
maintenance, bell crank assembly isolation during landing gear stroke, failure of the 
connecting link buckling under large compression loads or planing link bottoming out, 
dynamic unlock of the lock links and finally landing profiles.  Although multiple theories 
exist on the cause of the PMA failures, the exact chain of events is still unconfirmed at 
this time and a specific cause can’t be identified. 
 
A Landing Gear Action Team (LGAT) was created to find a solution to PMA 
failures.  The team studied different design enhancements to the main landing gear 
PMA to make it more resilient to failures.  By the redesign of some key parts, as 
described in Chapter 4, the LGAT aimed at increasing the hold down force to the axle 
lock links reducing the chances of a dynamic unlock type failure, increasing the bell 
crank gap to avoid contact during main landing gear stroke, and giving the connecting 
link a limited stroke capability to reduce buckling potential. 
 
Under a project carried out by the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment 
(AETE), the Canadian Air Force volunteered to assist NAVAIR in validating the 
proposed CF188 (Canadian designation of the F/A-18) modifications by collecting main 
landing gear data through flight test. 
 
This thesis consists of a complete independent analysis of the data that was 
gathered under the Canadian flight test program. 
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CHAPTER 2 – PROJECT AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Aim 
 
The aim of this thesis was to study the effectiveness of the proposed 
modifications to the CF188 main landing gear in order to reduce the risk of PMA 
failures. 
 
Objectives 
 
In order to meet the aim, the following objectives were studied by comparing the 
ground and flight test data from the baseline and the prototype CF188 main landing 
gear configurations: 
 
1.  Assess static hold down force during landing gear rigging; 
 
2.  Confirm the increase of the pinhead and bell crank gaps; 
 
3.  Assess the aircraft ground handling at various ground speeds; and 
 
4.  Assess the loads on the connecting link and planing link during numerous 
landings including touch and go, full stop, cable overrun and arresting cable 
engagements. 
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CHAPTER 3 - LANDING GEAR 
 
Purpose of Landing Gear 
 
The main purpose of the landing gear is to allow the aircraft to be controlled 
during takeoff, landing and ground operations.  Therefore, the landing gear must be 
able to absorb the loads and associated stresses.  It also allows the aircraft to be 
supported on the ground while keeping the proper clearance between the aircraft and 
the ground to support external stores such as external fuel tanks (EFT) and weapons.  
Depending on aircraft requirements, the landing gear may also have to be retractable to 
limit additional drag during flight or to reduce radar cross section.   
 
During aircraft design, creating the landing gear system is usually very 
challenging.  The landing gear must have the right tire and shock absorber size in 
accordance with the aircraft weight yet, if retractable, it must fit within the fuselage.  It 
must be at the proper location to allow aircraft rotation without impacting the tail on the 
ground either on takeoff or during landing.  It needs to be stable on landing and provide 
good steering capabilities that meet design requirements. 
 
Landing Gear Loads 
 
During its operation on the ground, the landing gear is subject to vertical, 
horizontal, lateral and crush loads.  The vertical loads are generally due to the weight of 
the aircraft and to the normal acceleration during touch down generated from the 
descent rate and aircraft weight at impact.  These loads affect the sizing of the shock 
absorber and of the tire.  Following initial impact at touch down, the weight of the aircraft 
felt on the landing gear will increase as the aircraft slows down and the lift is decreased.  
The horizontal loads, also known as drag loads, are generated from the friction between 
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the tire against the landing surface, and by the braking action during the deceleration.  
Usually this horizontal load is countered with a drag brace.  The lateral loads are 
generated either during turns on the ground or crabbed landings where any roll or/and 
yaw results in a lateral force component.  The lateral force component is usually 
countered by a side brace.  Finally, the crush load occurs when the aircraft runs over a 
relative sharp object such as an arresting cable for instance (5). 
 
The variables affecting the loads include, but are not limited to: aircraft weight, 
descent rate, aircraft attitude (in roll, yaw and pitch), deceleration requirements driven 
by the runway length or distance available post touch down, and finally landing gear 
maintenance and servicing.  Of note, wind and density altitude will affect the above 
mentioned variables. 
 
Variables such as tire and shock absorbers servicing were tightly controlled 
throughout this test program and they were considered constant for the purpose of this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 4 - EQUIPMENT UNDER TEST 
 
Aircraft  
 
The aircraft under test consisted of a CF188B (T/A-18B) as depicted on Figure 
A1.  The CF188B was a high performance, all weather, supersonic fighter and attack 
aircraft (6).  It was powered by two General Electric F404-GE-400 low-bypass axial flow 
turbofan engines equipped with afterburner (7).  The aircraft was designed with 
moderate swept mid-mounted wings with Leading Edge Extensions allowing 
manoeuvrability at high angle of attack and with twin vertical stabilizers inclined 20º 
outboard from the vertical.  The aircraft was equipped with a fly-by-wire hydraulically 
actuated flight control system including full span leading edge flaps, inboard trailing 
flaps, outboard ailerons, rudders and differential all moving horizontal stabilizers.  The 
aircraft was equipped with a tricycle landing gear arrangement.  The aircraft tail number 
was CF188907.  CF188907 developed by McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) was an 
instrumented two seat aircraft.   
 
Aircraft Configuration 
 
As depicted in Table A1, the aircraft configuration for the duration of the test 
consisted of two wing pylons on stations 3 and 7 and one EFT and pylon on station 5.  
The total aircraft weight with fuel and two aircrew was approximately 39,650 lbs. 
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Aircraft Instrumentation 
 
CF188907 was the test aircraft used at AETE.  The test aircraft was modified in 
order to gather analog and digital data, and video images.  Both the left and the right 
main landing gear were instrumented.  A telemetry system transmitted the data to the 
Flight Test Control Room (FTCR) allowing the aircraft and the landing gear parameters 
to be monitored real time.  The video images consisted of the Heads Up Display (HUD), 
two tail hook cameras, installed to capture images of both main landing gears, and an 
imagery technician also capturing footage from the side of the runway.  A list of 
parameters recorded during the flight test is available in Table A2. 
 
CF188 Landing Gear  
General  
 
The CF188 landing gear was a retractable tricycle type.  The landing gear was 
electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated.  The nose landing gear had two 
wheels in a dual arrangement.  A catapult launch bar was installed on the nose landing 
gear for catapult takeoff during aircraft carrier operation, but was inoperative in the case 
of aircraft CF188907.  The nose landing gear was equipped with hydraulic steering 
capability providing directional control on the ground through inputs from the rudder 
pedals.  The nose landing gear retracted forward and stored in the main fuselage under 
the front cockpit.  The main landing gear was a levered design with an oleo shock 
absorber in a single wheel arrangement.  The main landing gear was retracted aft and 
inboard from the down and locked position.  During retraction, the shock absorber was 
shrunk by the shrink link, and the main wheel was rotated 90º by the PMA to fit in the 
main landing gear wheel well located in the main fuselage under the engine inlets. 
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Main Landing Gear 
 
As depicted in Figures A2 to A4, the levered main landing gear consisted of a 
trunnion, side brace, axle lever, shock absorber, and the PMA.  The trunnion, the side 
brace and the connecting link were attached directly to the aircraft structure.  The PMA 
consisted of the connecting link, bell crank assembly, planing link, planing arm spring, 
shrink link, and axle lock links. 
 
The purpose of the PMA was to rotate the wheel 90º and to compress the shock 
absorber, shrinking the main landing gear to meet the limited wheel well space 
requirements during retraction.  The connecting link was rigid.  It was attached to the 
aircraft structure at the top and to the bell crank assembly at the bottom.  Through the 
bell crank assembly, it pulled the planing link and the shrink link during landing gear 
retraction.  The planing link had limited stroke capability and was in series with the 
connecting link via the bell crank assembly.  It was attached to the bell crank assembly 
at the top and to the planing arm and lock links at the bottom.  The planing link unlocked 
the axle lock links, rotated the wheel, held the axle against the planing stop when the 
main landing gear was retracted, and applied preload to the axle lock links known as 
hold down force.  The shrink link was telescopic and was also attached to the bell crank 
assembly and to the axle.  It pulled on the axle and compressed the shock absorber 
during retraction.  The axle lock links were located on the axle and were driven by the 
planing link.  They rotated the axle and were the over center lock mechanism when the 
gear was extended and locked.  The planing arm spring simply provided additional hold 
down force to the axle lock links when the gear was extended.   
Main Landing Gear Retraction Sequence 
 
The landing gear retraction sequence was initiated by selecting the landing gear 
handle to the up position.  This provided hydraulic pressure to the main landing gear 
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side brace actuator, the retract actuator, the up lock mechanism sequence valve, the 
doors up lock hook, and the wheel brake and anti-skid system. 
 
First, the brake system stopped the wheel rotation.  Second, the side brace 
became unlocked allowing the initiation of the gear retraction by the retract actuator.  As 
the trunnion rotated aft, the connecting link pulled on the bell crank assembly which 
then pulled on the shrink link and the planing link.  The shrink link compressed the 
shock absorber while the planing link unlocked the axle lock links rotating the axle 90º to 
fit in the wheel well.  The up lock mechanisms then locked the landing gear in place and 
the doors closed under hydraulic pressure. 
Prototype Parts 
 
The modified parts included a urethane spring added inside the planing link, 
replacement of the aluminum connecting link cartridge with a collapsible urethane core 
cartridge, revised geometry for the rigid connecting link, and a shortened dogbone.  The 
modified parts are depicted in Figure A5. 
 
The purpose of the urethane connecting link cartridge was to provide the 
connecting link with a limited stroke capability (0.070 in.).  This limited stroke capability 
would reduce the potential of connecting link buckling under a large compression load.   
 
The planing link urethane spring was added to increase the stiffness of the 
planing link and the hold down force.  This would decrease the possibility of planing link 
bottoming out under a large compression load and reduce the chance of a dynamic 
unlock of the lock links. 
 
The geometry of the rigid connecting link was revised to increase the pinhead 
gap to decrease the possibility of bell crank isolation failure which would occur when the 
rigid connecting link would come in contact with the bell crank assembly.  The rigid 
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connecting link thickness was decreased from 0.31 in. to 0.21 in., hence increasing the 
pinhead gap by 0.10 in. 
 
The dogbone was shortened to provide more latitude during rigging of the 
connecting link and the planing link.  The shorter dogbone would also increase bell 
crank clearance avoiding parts contacting, reducing the chance of load isolation. 
 
Landing Gear Configurations 
 
For comparison purposes, data was gathered using two landing gear 
configurations.  The first configuration was the existing CF188 main landing gear 
configuration.  This configuration was used as the baseline.  The second configuration 
consisted of the modified parts including the urethane connecting link cartridge, planing 
link urethane spring, revised rigid connecting link, and shortened dogbone. 
 
Cold Lake Airfield 
 
All test flights took place at 4 Wing Cold Lake.  The Cold Lake airfield, as 
depicted in Figure A6, had three primary runways.  They consisted of 13L/31R, 13R/31L 
and 22/04.  The runway lengths were 12,600 ft, 10,000 ft, and 8,270 ft respectively and 
were made of asphalt.  For telemetry reasons and for ease of having a dedicated 
runway during the test flights, the primary runway used was 13R/31L referred to as the 
Outer Runway.  This runway was equipped with a BLISS 500S arresting cable at each 
end located at 1,360 ft (10). In order to avoid damaging the instrumentation, the runway 
was bare and dry for every test flight. 
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CHAPTER 5 - TEST CONCEPT 
 
General 
 
Testing was divided into three phases using a build up approach.  The first phase 
consisted of evaluating the maintenance rigging and to obtain static measurements.  
The second phase consisted of ground handling quality testing where capture tasks 
were conducted at different taxi speeds.  The third and final phase consisted of different 
landing profiles including touch and go, full stop, cable overrun and cable arrestment 
landings.  Variables such as aircraft weight, roll angle, yaw angle, and vertical velocity 
were controlled.  The pilot used the HUD information such as the Vertical Speed 
Indicator (VSI) in ft/min and the flight path angle in order to be on test condition.  Aircraft 
attitude was maintained to touch down, i.e. no landing techniques such as flaring or 
rounding were used.  Aircraft parameters at touch down were monitored real time by the 
FTCR in order to validate each data point.  The FTCR also monitored landing gear 
status to ensure safe operation. 
 
Phase 1 - Landing Gear Rigging 
 
The purpose of the landing gear rigging was to capture all the adjustments made 
during the execution of standard maintenance procedures.  The measurements were 
recorded before and after the test flights for both configurations.  Of interest, the hold 
down torques were recorded when the shock absorber was fully compressed, then 
extended by 4 in., 8 in., 12 in. and fully extended (12.3 in.) while the aircraft was on 
maintenance jacks.  At each test point, the length of the planing link spring was 
captured.  Other measurements included lengths of the connecting link, planing link, 
shrink link, planing arm spring and bell crank gaps. 
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Phase 2 - Ground Handling 
 
The purpose of this test was to evaluate the handling characteristics of the 
prototype configuration compared to the baseline configuration during directional ground 
manoeuvres.  It was also used as a build up approach to takeoff and landing data 
points.  Ground handling tests consisted of centreline capture at low, medium and high 
taxi speed.  Targeted knots ground speed (KGS) were 30 ± 5 KGS, 60 ± 5 KGS and 80 
± 20 KGS respectively.  The aircraft was offset from the centreline by approximately 5 
and 10 ft during the low and moderate ground speed taxi test and only by 5 ft during the 
high speed taxi test.  Once offset by the required distance, inputs up to ½ rudder with 
the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) in low gain were applied to regain the centreline.  (Of 
note, the NWS in low gain was normally used for takeoff and landing operation, allowing 
the nose wheel to a deflection of up to ± 16º compared to ± 75º in high gain.  The high 
gain was mostly used during tight turns).  The desired performance required capturing 
the centreline within ±3 ft in 3 sec and ±5 ft for adequate performance.  The Cooper 
Harper Rating Scale, depicted in Figure A7, was used to quantify the handling qualities 
during the capture task.  Pilot induced oscillation (PIO) tendency, centreline overshoot 
and roll/yaw transient were also evaluated. 
 
Phase 3 – Landings 
 
Different landing profiles were evaluated in order to cover most of the aircraft 
landing envelope and to gather a variety of data points.  Landing profiles consisted of 
touch and go, full stop, cable overrun and cable arrestment landings.  The aircraft 
attitude varied from straight landing without any crab or roll angles, landing with only ±5º 
of crab angle, landings with only ±5º of roll angle, and finally, landings with ±5º of crab 
and ±5º of roll in the same and opposite direction.  The crab angle was defined as the 
angle between the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the ground track while the roll 
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angle was the angle between the horizontal and the lateral axis.  For the test point to be 
valid, the targeted angles had to be within ±2º.  Weight of the aircraft varied from 39,000 
lbs down to 28,000 lbs and the descent rate from 6 ft/sec to 14 ft/sec in a 2 ft/sec 
increment.  (Of note, the Canadian Air Force did not require 20 ft/sec descent rate 
landings, as they don’t operate from aircraft carriers). 
 
The purpose of the touch and go landings was to gather landing data while 
minimizing the down time ensuring test efficiency.  All the touch and go landings were 
carried out past the arrestment cable.  Positive contact with the runway was established 
with the NWS indication displayed in the HUD prior to go around.  Once airborne, the 
mission controller, operating from the FTCR, gave the all clear call authorizing the pilot 
to retract the landing gear.  (Of note, unlike U.S. Navy patterns, the landing gear was 
retracted following every touch and go).  This was followed by a closed pattern.  During 
the downwind, the parameters were reviewed and the validity of the data point was 
determined by the mission controller.  The flight test engineer (FTE), occupying the rear 
seat, then briefed the pilot on the next landing parameters.  On final, the pilot aimed to 
be on condition about 1-2 miles from touch down and maintained that condition to 
minimize any rates at touch down.  Upon touch down, the FTE initiated the tail hook 
cameras.  Unfortunately, the tail hook camera lenses became dirty within the first couple 
of landings, reducing the quality of images recorded throughout the mission. 
 
Full stop landings were conducted for each of the 6, 10 and 14 ft/sec descent 
rate series.  These landings were all straight without crab and roll.  The purpose of the 
full stop landing was to evaluate the loads on the landing gear created by the braking 
action. 
 
Cable overrun consisted of landings prior to the arrestment cable allowing the 
aircraft to roll over the cable.  The purpose was to evaluate the crush loads caused by 
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the cable.  All these landings were conducted with yaw and roll angles and at 6, 10 and 
14 ft/sec descent rate. 
 
The last landing for the 6, 10 and 14 ft/sec descent rate series consisted of an 
arrested landing.  These landings were carried out without any crab or roll angles using 
a BLISS 500S arresting cable. 
 
For consistency, only three test pilots flew all the missions.  Each test pilot first 
went to the simulator and practised the different landing profiles in different wind 
conditions. 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
To mitigate the risk associated with such testing, all the modified connecting links 
and planing links were laboratory tested simulating similar loads to those expected 
during landings. 
 
To further minimize the risk, the flight test was conducted in a build up approach.  
The ground handling test had to be conducted successfully prior to the flight test phase.  
Using the same principle, slow descent rate landings where carried out prior to high 
descent rate landings and straight landings before roll and crab landings.  For safety 
reasons, every 7th landing was a full stop followed by a quick visual inspection by the 
maintainers of the landing gear and of the main tires.  Furthermore, a crosswind limit of 
10 knots was used for every test point.  This limit was changed during testing to 5 knots 
of crosswind for crab away and roll away test points.  Finally, any test point that 
exceeded ±7º of roll or crab angles, or the pre-set safety load for a given component, as 
indicated in the FTCR by the live telemetry system, resulted in a go-around with the 
landing gear remaining in the extended position followed by a full stop or cable 
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engagement.  A complete maintenance inspection was then conducted.  The list of pre-
set safety parameters is available in Table A3. 
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CHAPTER 6 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
General 
 
All phases of testing took place at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada, from 14 
March 2008 to 6 May 2008.  A total of 271 landings were conducted during 16 test flight 
missions testing four different configurations.  For the purpose of this thesis, the data for 
80 landings were reviewed and analysed, comparing the baseline configuration landings 
to the full prototype configuration landings. 
 
Phase 1 – Landing Gear Rigging 
CF188 Rigging Procedures Fleet Survey  
 
A fleet survey of the CF188 was conducted to evaluate the spectrum of key 
component lengths used during rigging procedures.  As depicted in Figures A8 and A9, 
there was a wide spectrum of connecting link length, pinhead gaps and planing link 
spring lengths validating the concerns of failures due to main landing gear rigging 
procedures.  As the data shows from these figures, the length of the connecting link had 
a direct influence on the pinhead gap and sequentially on the planing link.  While the 
connecting link length varied by 0.12 in., the planing link spring length varied by 0.30 in. 
which was the equivalent of 27% of the total spring stroke (1.125 in.).  A connecting link 
that is too long will result in a smaller pinhead gap which could be more prone to bell 
crank assembly isolation type failure.  In addition, a too long connecting link will result in 
a smaller planing link, reducing the planing link stroke available, increasing the chances 
of planing link bottoming out under large compression loads.  On the other hand, a too 
short connecting link will require a longer planing link reducing the hold down force.  
Rigging of these key components with the right balance while maintaining the required 
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clearances once the gear is retracted is therefore essential to minimize PMA failures.  
More restrictive limits should be in effect to improve the standard of the rigging 
procedures used through out the CF188 fleet. 
Connecting Link Length 
 
The connecting link lengths were evaluated during rigging procedures of each 
configuration and after the completion of the flight test.  The ideal weight off wheel 
connecting link length was considered to be 6.55 in.  Table A4 shows the difference 
between the baseline configuration and the prototype configuration connecting length.  
During the rigging of the prototype configuration, it was reported by the technicians that 
the shorter dogbone made it significantly easier to set the connecting link length to 6.55 
in.  The pre-rigging of the connecting link to 6.55 in. maintained a proper bell crank and 
pinhead gap, while ensuring that the axle stop was engaged when the landing gear was 
retracted in the wheel well.  The shorter dogbone will allow rigging of the connecting link 
within tighter limits.  This will result in reducing the number of variables during rigging 
procedures, hence further standardizing the rigging procedures. 
Pinhead Gap and Bell Crank Gap 
 
The pinhead gap and the bell crank gap were evaluated before and after the test 
flights for both configurations.  Measurements were first taken with weight off wheels 
(WOFFW) while the aircraft was on maintenance jacks, and then with weight on wheels 
(WONW).  The measurements are summarized in Table A5.  In general, the gaps 
decreased with WONW as the shock absorber was compressed.  The most remarkable 
difference between the two configurations occurred for the pinhead gap.  Averaging the 
difference between the baseline and the prototype configuration, the pinhead gap 
increased by an average of 0.10 in. with WOFFW and 0.15 in. with WONW.  With 
regards to the bell crank gap, very minor improvements were found.  The modified rigid 
connecting link combined with the shorter dogbone allowed an increase in the pinhead 
gap by 0.10 in. when WOFFW and by 0.15 in. with WONW.  Given that the rigid 
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connecting link was redesigned to reduce the thickness of the inside lug by 0.10 in., it 
would also imply that the shorter dogbone also contributed to improve the pinhead gap 
by 0.05 in. with WONW.  From a static point of view, this pinhead gap improvement will 
reduce the chances of bell crank isolation type of PMA failures.  Furthermore, it will 
facilitate rigging of the landing gear by reducing one of the variables.   
Planing Link Spring 
 
The planing link spring length was evaluated at different shock absorber strokes.  
While the aircraft was on maintenance jacks, the landing gear was extended in 
sequence and measurements of the planing link spring length were taken at 0, 4, 6, 8, 
12 and 12.3 in. shock absorber extension (i.e. from fully compressed to fully extended).  
As depicted in Figure A10, the prototype planing link had initially more compression 
loads as indicated by the smaller planing link spring length.  As the shock absorber 
compressed, the planing link spring was compressed further.  Interestingly, the spring 
did not compress at the same rate for the two configurations.  The baseline planing link 
spring compressed an average of 0.34 in. while the prototype planing link spring with 
the urethane spring compressed an average of 0.24 in.  This confirmed that from a 
static point of view, the urethane spring added to the planing link resulted in more 
stiffness.  This improvement of 0.10 in. (29%) will reduce the risk of PMA failures due to 
the planing link bottoming out. 
Static Hold Down Torque 
 
The static hold down torque was measured with aircraft on maintenance jacks 
(WOFFW).  Measurements were taken at different shock absorber extension.  The hold 
down torque was measured as indicated by the torque required to unlock the axle lock 
links mechanism.  The lock links were considered unlocked when it was possible to pull 
on the feeler gauge only using a small pull force.  The feeler gauge was installed 
between the planing arm stop and the axle lever down stop.  In both cases, the hold 
down torque was greater than the minimum of 56 ft-lbs required during normal rigging.  
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As depicted in Figure A11 and as expected by the planing link spring length, the hold 
down torque had a tendency to increase as the shock absorber was compressed and 
this was more significant for the prototype configuration (slopes were of -1.0 vs -3.4 ft-
lbs/in.).  The prototype compared to the baseline configuration had an overall 43.8 ft-lbs 
(52%) increase when the shock absorber was fully compressed and an increase of 13.8 
ft-lbs (20%) when the shock absorber was fully extended. This confirmed that the added 
stiffness by the urethane spring and the prototype PMA configuration resulted in an 
increase in the hold down torque.  The prototype configuration will allow an increase in 
the hold down force which will reduce the risk of PMA failures due to dynamic unlock of 
the lock links. 
 
Phase 2 – Ground Handling 
 
The handling qualities of the baseline and the prototype configurations were 
evaluated on the ground during centreline capture tasks.  At different ground speeds; 
30, 60 and 80 KGS, and with an offset of 5 and 10 ft, centreline capture tasks were 
conducted using up to ½ rudder pedal inputs.  The centreline capture tasks were 
conducted from both the left and right using runway 31R.  Although some minor inertial 
effects were felt at higher speed, capturing the centreline within desire performance (±3 
ft within ±3 sec) was easy and did not result in any PIO tendency.  Essentially, from a 
pilot point of view, no differences between the two landing gear configurations were 
noticeable.  Handling Quality Ratings (HQR) of 2 and 3 were given to both 
configurations.  HQR results can be found in Tables A6 and A7.  Within the scope of 
this test, the ground handling qualities of the prototype configuration were found similar 
to the handling qualities of the baseline configuration.  Therefore, the prototype 
configuration did not improve nor negatively impacted the ground handling quality of the 
aircraft at various ground speeds.  
 
 
 21 
Phase 3 – Landings 
Loads During Landing Gear Retraction 
 
Main landing gear retraction loads were evaluated during flight testing.  The 
landing gear was retracted following every takeoff.  Of interest, was the transfer of the 
loads created by the braking action on the wheel onto the planing and connecting links 
as part of the retraction sequence.  Graphics depicting representative loads during gear 
retraction are presented in Figures A12 and A13.  From these figures, the loads from 
the landing gear retraction can be found when the wheel speed is drastically slowed 
down, as the braking action on the wheel was one of the first actions to take place after 
the gear selection handle was put into the up position.  For this given baseline 
configuration example, the maximum compression load transferred to the planing link 
during the retraction was 425 lbs and 1,097 lbs to the connecting link.  The wheel speed 
was 1,399 revolution per minute (RPM) at the moment of the retraction.  For the 
prototype configuration, the numbers were essentially the same.  With a wheel speed of 
1,809 RPM, the maximum compression loads on the prototype planing and connecting 
links were 459 lbs and 1,049 lbs respectively.  Of note, the pinhead gap instrumentation 
could only measured gaps up to 0.22 in. which explains the straight line in Figure A13.  
Analysing all the compression loads revealed that, first the loads from the braking action 
as part of the landing gear retraction were not significant and that the loads on the 
prototype configuration were similar to the loads on the baseline configuration.  
Analysing all the tension loads revealed that the loads on the prototype and the baseline 
configuration were similar and consistent.  The largest tension load was experienced by 
the connecting link and was in the 8,000 lbs range where the loads on the planing link 
were in the 1,500 lbs range.  Within the scope of this study, the prototype landing gear 
did not improve nor deteriorate the load transferred to the PMA during landing gear 
retraction. 
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Braking Action Loads 
 
The effect of the braking action on the PMA was evaluated during full stop 
landings on dry runways.  For the purpose of this study, 10 landings were analysed with 
the baseline configuration and 8 landings with the prototype configuration. Touch downs 
occurred between 120 and 160 KCAS and braking action were generally applied around 
100 KCAS.  As depicted in Figures A14 and A15, the braking action had minimal impact 
on the PMA.  The maximum loads to the planing and connecting links occurred at touch 
down where large compression loads were observed.  The braking action resulted in 
compression loads in the order of approximately 70% of the loads created at touch 
down.  Within the scope of this study, the prototype landing gear did not improve nor 
deteriorate the loads transferred to the PMA during normal braking action. 
Cable Arrestment Landings 
 
The effect of rapid deceleration was evaluated during cable arrestment landings.  
For the purpose of this study, two cable arrestment landings were analysed with the 
baseline configuration, and two with the prototype configuration.  In general, the aircraft 
came to a stop within 7 to 9 sec following cable engagement.  As an example, data from 
two landings are depicted in Figures A16 and A17.  As shown, the rapid deceleration 
had no effect on the PMA components.  The only large compression or tension loads 
were once again observed at touch down and during the cable overrun.  Within the 
scope of this study, the prototype landing gear did not improve nor deteriorate the loads 
transferred to the PMA during cable arrestment landings.   
Cable Overrun 
 
 The effect of cable overrun was evaluated during touch and go landings and 
cable arrestment landings, as the aircraft rolled over the cable before the engagement.  
In all cases, the crush loads transferred to the system from the cable overrun were 
noticeable as depicted in Figures A18 and A19.  For the baseline configuration, the 
compression load transferred to the planing link was either similar or greater than the 
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touch down loads.  However, the loads never exceeded 20% of the available 
compression load based on the pre-set safety parameter of 5,000 lbs in compression.  
The loads created by the cable overrun to the connecting link, side brace and the shock 
absorber were minimal when compared to respective initial touch down loads.  This was 
also applicable to the prototype configuration.  However, the compression loads 
transferred to the prototype planing link were smaller in magnitude.  In no cases did it 
exceed 30% of the initial touch down load, equivalent to 10% of the pre-set safety 
parameter.  The better resistance of the prototype planing link to cable overrun can be 
explained by the increase in the stiffness provided by the urethane spring.  Although it is 
not suspected that cable overruns could create crush loads to the PMA that could result 
in failures, the prototype landing gear was more resistant to these loads, and 
consequentially was an improvement to the existent design. 
Touch Down Loads 
 
Loads at touch down on PMA components were evaluated and analysed over 80 
landings with different descent rates and different aircraft attitudes.  The initial loads 
created by the touch down were, in general, the largest loads observed through the 
landing event.  Most of the components such as the lock links, planing link, shrink link, 
connecting link and shock absorber were in compression.  The side brace had transient 
loads in compression but was typically in tension.  A representative example of the 
loads at touch down is depicted in Figures A20 and A21.  Of interest from these figures 
were the side brace and the connecting link being out of phase by 180º, the lock links 
and the shock absorber loads being in phase and the prototype planing link being in 
phase with the connecting link loads while the baseline was not. 
 
For the baseline configuration, the maximum loads were normally observed 
within the first 1 in. of shock absorber compression stroke, as depicted in Figure 22.  
Cross referring with Figure A11, the static hold down torque was at its minimum when 
the shock absorber was fully extended.  Hence, the maximum compression loads 
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occurred on the PMA when the hold down torque was also at its minimum.  When 
analysing the data for the prototype configuration, it was observed that the maximum 
compression loads generally occurred when the shock absorber was extended by 5 in.  
For the prototype configuration, the difference in the static hold down torque between 12 
in. and 5 in. of shock absorber extension was approximately an additional 20 ft-lbs.  
Therefore, the maximum loads on the prototype configuration were occurring at a more 
convenient moment when comparing with the static hold down torque.  
 
Analysing the data, it was observed that the tension loads in the side brace were 
in phase with the compression loads in the connecting link.  This was true for both 
configurations.  However, only the baseline had the maximum compression connecting 
link loads essentially at the same time as the maximum tension side brace load.  The 
prototype maximum compression connecting link load occurred 1 to 2 cycles after, 
suggesting that the side brace had less of an effect on the prototype connecting link.  
When plotting the maximum connecting link compression load as a function of the 
maximum side brace tension load, as shown in Figure A23, it can be observed that the 
loads on the baseline configuration had a tendency to converge towards the connecting 
link compression safety limit faster than the prototype configuration, even though the 
initial compression loads were lesser.  Although the compression loads on the prototype 
connecting link were initially greater, they were more constant and did not display the 
same abrupt conversion towards the safety limit.  Further data would be required to 
ensure that the same abrupt conversion does not exist at greater side brace tension 
loads for the prototype configuration.  Within the scope of this analysis, the prototype 
configuration would be promising, providing a better safety margin to the connecting link 
with high side brace tension loads.  The prototype PMA would then be more resilient to 
failures where buckling of the connecting link is the initial cause. 
 
Considering the compression loads on the planing link equivalent in magnitude to 
the hold down force applied to the lock links, a greater compression load on the planing 
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link would imply better hold down force.  As depicted in Figure A24, the compression 
loads on the prototype planing link were greater when compared to the baseline planing 
link compression loads.  The baseline planing link demonstrated a tendency to level off 
at 600 lbs in compression loads, although the shock absorber loads where greater (note 
that shock absorber loads were used in order to capture both the impact of the aircraft 
weight and descent rate at touch down).  Unlike the baseline, the prototype planing link 
compression loads continuously increased with the shock absorber loads, providing a 
better hold down force as the load on the landing gear was greater.  In addition, the 
baseline planing link compression loads had a tendency to decrease initially, and then 
increase again as depicted by the circle on Figure A20.  As stated earlier, these 
compression loads, being proportional to the hold down force, would imply that the 
decrease in compression would also mean a decrease in hold down force.  As the lock 
links did not have that initial decrease in compression, it could be concluded that this 
was an important contributing factor to dynamic unlock type of failure.  This decrease in 
compression loads was not observed on the prototype planing link.  Therefore, the 
prototype configuration would be less prone to dynamic unlocks as the planing link did 
not show that same behaviour.   
 
Finally, the planing link displacements for the prototype configuration were 
smaller, as depicted in Figure A25, providing a better safety margin with issues such as 
bottoming out of the planing link in compression.  This confirmed that the planing link 
urethane spring added stiffness to the system.  The improvement in planing link 
displacement will avoid planing link bottoming out in compression, thus decreasing the 
chances of failure.  
Connecting Link Buckling Incident 
 
After the completion of testing one of the partial configurations, which consisted 
of testing the prototype planing link and shorter dogbone only, the right connecting link 
was found slightly bent by about 1º.  This was not noticeable with the naked eye while 
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the baseline connecting link was installed.  The buckle in the connecting link was found 
during the maintenance activities required to change the landing configuration.  Of note, 
none of the previous landings had resulted in exceeding the pre-set safety parameters, 
nor triggering the cockpit warning lights and tone associated with a planing link failure.  
The data also revealed that the lock links remained in the lock position for all the 
landings during that mission.  This resulted in a pause in testing until the safety 
parameters were reviewed as well as a new risk mitigation developed.  Reviewing the 
data preceding this incident revealed that the maximum compression load applied to the 
connecting link was - 5,076 lbs during a 758 fpm descent, -1º of roll and -2º of crab 
(please note that negative roll angle implied left wing down and negative crab angle 
implied that the nose of the aircraft was pointed to the left, from the pilot perspective). 
The safety compression load for the connecting link was brought up from - 6,000 lbs to         
- 4,000 lbs as an additional risk mitigation.  A maintenance inspection tool was 
immediately designed to help detecting slight bent in the connecting link and was used 
as a pre-flight inspection from that point on. 
 
Based on this incident, one of the theories for PMA failures was then confirmed 
where the connecting link could be initially failing, hence starting the chain of event.  
The connecting link may suffer minor buckling without immediately resulting in a planing 
link failure.  This would go unnoticed as the warning lights and tone would not be 
triggered.  The connecting link would then be weakened at that point, especially in 
compression.  The length of the connecting link would also be shortened by that 
buckling.  Because a shorter connecting link will result in a smaller hold down force, 
then the landing gear will now be more prone to a dynamic unlock situation or suffer 
more connecting link buckling from another landing.  Any of these situations would then 
result in a PMA failure. 
 
Inspecting the connecting links as part of the daily inspection for all CF188 using 
the tool that was developed during the test program, will reduce this type of PMA 
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failures, given the aircraft is inspected between the minor buckling and the catastrophic 
failure.  This preventive maintenance should be adopted throughout the fleet.      
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 
 
 The aim of this thesis was to study the effectiveness of the proposed 
modifications to the CF188 landing gear in order to reduce the risk of PMA failures.  As 
the PMA failures were always associated to the unlocking of the lock links as part of the 
chain of event, it was therefore essential to assess the hold down force from the planing 
link.   
 
From a static point of view, and as indicated by the torque required to unlock the 
lock links during maintenance procedures, the prototype planing link offered an 
important increase in the hold down force.  The increase in the hold down force went 
from 20% with the landing gear fully extended and to 52% with the landing gear fully 
compressed. 
 
 From a dynamic point of view, the hold down force was also greater with the 
prototype than with the baseline.  While the baseline planing link loads levelled up at 
600 lbs in compression, the prototype planing link loads where continuously increasing 
and went up to 1,600 lbs in compression.   
 
 Although the prototype planing link compression loads were greater than the 
baseline, the planing link spring displacement was less, providing better safety margin 
against planing link bottoming out in compression.  In addition, this confirmed that the 
urethane spring added to the planing link did improve the planing link stiffness.  The 
increase in stiffness was also noticeable against crush loads during cable overrun 
landings, where the prototype planing link was not as affected by the crush loads when 
compared to the baseline. 
 
 The modifications to the rigid connecting link and the shorter dogbone allowed 
better clearances for the bell crank assembly gaps, facilitating rigging procedures.  This 
was mostly noticeable for the pinhead gaps.  The increase in the pinhead gap will 
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decrease the chances of having bell crank assembly isolation, where greater loads 
could be transferred to the connecting link potentially resulting in buckling.  Therefore, 
these modifications will decrease the number of planing link failures.   
 
 As evaluated during capture task at different ground taxi speed, the handling 
qualities of the prototype landing gear were deemed similar as the baseline 
configuration.  Within the scope of this study, the prototype configuration did not 
improve nor negatively impact the ground handling quality of the aircraft on the ground. 
 
 The loads created on the landing gear were analysed during touch and go, full 
stop, cable overrun and arresting cable engagement landings.  It was observed that the 
most important loads occurred upon touch down.  A relationship was observed between 
the side brace and the connecting link loads.  Although the compression loads on the 
connecting link where greater for the prototype, they were more constant and did not 
display the same abrupt increase as the baseline did when the side brace tension loads 
were in the 40,000 to 60,000 lbs range.  
 
As experienced with the connecting link buckling incident, the connecting link 
could some time be the first event of a PMA failure.  It could be slightly bent first, go 
unnoticed for some time, followed by a catastrophic type of failure.  This type of failure 
could easily be avoided by using the inspection tool that was developed during the flight 
test program as part of the pre-flight inspection to ensure the connecting link was not 
bent.   
 
The overall performance of the CF188 landing gear upgrade was found 
acceptable and will decrease the risk of PMA failures.  
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Figure A1. Aircraft CF188907 
 
 
Table A1. Aircraft Test Configuration 
 
Station Loading And Suspension 
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9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Centerline Empty Empty Pylon Empty EFT Empty Pylon Empty Empty 
Note: External Fuel Tank (EFT) 
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Table A2.  Flight Test Instrumentation Parameters 
 
Measurand Description 
Eng 
Units 
(EU) 
Approximate 
EU Range 
 
Sampling 
Rate 
(SPS) 
Shock Absorber Oleo Lug 
Load lbs 
-150,000 to 
+8,000 913.60 
Lower Side Brace Load lbs -65,000 to 
+85,000 913.60 
Connecting Link Load lbs -8,000 to 
+8,000 913.60 
Planing Link Load lbs -5,000 to 
+10,000 913.60 
Shrink Link Load lbs -1,000 to 
+10,000 913.60 
 Inner Lower Lock Link Load lbs -25,000 to 
+5,000 913.60 
Outer Lower Lock Link Load lbs -25,000 to 
+5,000 913.60 
Planing Arm Angular 
Displacement deg 0 to 8 913.60 
MLG Axle Lever Nz g -100 to +100 913.60 
Planing Arm Nz g -100 to +100 913.60 
Axle Lever Position deg 0 to 60 913.60 
Planing Link Spring 
Displacement in. 0 to -1 913.60 
Bell-Crank Pinhead Gap 
Displacement in. 0 to 0.210 913.60 
Trunnion Position deg 0 to 105 913.60 
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Table A2.  Continued. 
 
Measurand Description 
Eng 
Units 
(EU) 
Approximate 
EU Range 
 
Sampling 
Rate 
(SPS) 
Connecting Link Stroke in. 0 to -0.02 913.60 
Shock Absorber Stroke in. 0 to 12 913.60 
Wheel Speed rpm 90 to 3000 913.60 
MLG Brake Temperature deg F -40 to +500 488.28 
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Figure A2.  Landing Gear Components (Front View) 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.  Landing Gear Components (Top View)
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Figure A4.  Landing Gear Components (Side View) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure A5.  Prototype PMA Components 
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Figure A6.  Cold Lake Airfield 
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Figure A7.  Cooper Harper Rating Scale 
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Table A3. Pre-Set Safety Parameters. 
 
Parameter Inspection Limits  (lbs) 
Compression = -5,000 
Planing Link Load 
Tension = +6,000 
Compression = -4,000 
Connecting Link 
Load 
Tension = +10,000 
Shrink Link Load 
Tension = +10,000 
 
Compression = -1,000 
Compression = -27,000 per link 
Inner / Outer Lock 
Links Load 
Tension = +7,200 per link 
Compression = -140,000 
Shock Absorber 
Load 
Tension = +12,000 
Compression = -60,000 
Side Brace Load 
Tension = +95,000 
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Figure A8.  Fleet Survey of Pinhead Gap vs Connecting Link Length 
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Figure A9.  Fleet Survey of Connecting Link vs Planing Link Spring Length 
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Table A4.  Weight Off Wheel Connecting Link Length 
 
Baseline Prototype Configuration 
Pre Flight 
Test 
Post Flight 
Test 
Pre Flight 
Test 
Post Flight 
Test 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
6.5785/6.5750 6.5785/6.5750 6.5540/6.5595 6.5570/6.5665 
 
 
Table A5.  Baseline and Prototype Comparison of Pinhead Gap and Bell Crank Gap 
 
Baseline Prototype  
Pre Flight 
Test 
Post Flight 
Test 
Pre Flight 
Test 
Post Flight 
Test Parameter 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
LH / RH 
(in.) 
Pinhead Gap 
(WOFFW) 0.200/0.1850 0.2750/0.2750 0.3490/0.3585 0.3175/0.3490 
Pinhead Gap 
(WONW) 0.1300/0.1290 0.0950/0.0860 0.2303/0.3115 0.2460/0.2690 
Bell Crank 
Gap (WOFFW) 0.1465/0.1465 0.1400/0.1410 0.1955/0.2105 0.1470/0.1840 
Bell Crank 
Gap (WONW) 0.0950/0.0850 0.0800/0.0850 0.1085/0.1270 0.0870/0.1020 
Aircraft Weight 26,900 lbs 29,200 lbs 32,900 lbs 30,600 lbs 
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Figure A10.  Planing Link Spring Length vs Shock Absorber Extension (WOFFW) 
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Figure A11.  Hold Down Torque vs Shock Absorber Extension (WOFFW)
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Table A6.  Centerline Capture Task (Baseline Configuration) 
 
Event 
Ground 
Speed 
(KGS) 
Fuel 
(lbs) 
Wind 
(kts) HQR 
Low Speed Taxi 5 ft & 10 ft 30 11400 110/05 2,2 
Med Speed Taxi 5 ft 60 11100 110/05 3,3 
Med Speed Taxi 10 ft 60 10900 070/05 3,3 
High Speed Taxi 5 ft 80 10800 060/06 3,3 
High Speed Taxi 10 ft 80 9800 060/07 3,3 
 
 
Table A7.  Centerline Capture Task (Prototype Configuration) 
 
Event 
Ground 
Speed 
(KGS) 
Fuel 
(lbs) 
Wind 
(kts) HQR 
Low Speed Taxi 5ft & 10ft 30 11500 350/9 2,2 
Med Speed Taxi 5ft 60 11400 350/9 2,2 
Med Speed Taxi 10ft 60 11300 350/9 2,2 
High Speed Taxi 5ft 80 11000 340/6 3,3 
High Speed Taxi 10ft 80 10400 020/5 3,3 
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Table A8.  Measurement Definitions 
 
Measurement Location 
 
 
Connecting Link 
Length 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pinhead Gap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gap Between Bell 
Cranks 
 
 
 
 
 
Planing Link Spring 
Length Inside 
Washers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planing Arm Spring 
Length From Base 
Including Retaining 
Cap 
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Table A9.  Landing Gear Rigging Measurements (Baseline) 
 
Baseline  Parameter Pre Flight Test Post Flight Test 
Location LH RH LH RH 
Connecting Link Length 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
6,5785 6,575 6,5785 6,575 
Pinhead Gap 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
0,2 0,185 0,275 0,275 
Gap Between Bell Cranks 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
0,1465 0,1465 0,14 0,141 
Planing Link Spring Length 
Inside Washers 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
3,628 3,5985 3,632 3,61 
Hold Down Torque 0" (Fully 
Compressed) MLG Shock 
Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
90 88 80 76 
Planing Link Spring Length 
0" (Fully      Compressed) 
MLG Shock Stroke  
(in.) 
3,306 3,26 3,3 3,26 
Hold Down Torque 4" MLG 
Shock Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
85 85 78 78 
Planing Link Spring Length 
4" MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 3,3775 3,343 3,368 3,36 
Planing Link Spring Length 
6" MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 3,442 3,388 3,32 3,38 
 
 47 
Table A9.  Continued. 
 
Baseline  Parameter Pre Flight Test Post Flight Test 
Location LH RH LH RH 
Hold Down Torque 8" MLG 
Shock Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
78 85 73 75 
  
Planing Link Spring Length 
8" MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 
3,4675 3,433 3,46 3,415 
Planing Link Spring Length 
12" MLG Shock Stroke 
 (in.) 
3,6165 3,578 3,6 3,568 
Hold Down Torque 12.3" 
(Fully Extended) MLG Shock 
Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
72 70 68 68 
 
Planing Link Spring 12.3" 
(Fully Extended) MLG Shock 
Stroke 
(in.) 
3,646 3,608 3,63 3,605 
Pinhead Gap 
(WONW) 
(in.) 
0,13 0,129 0,095 0,086 
Gap Between Bell Cranks 
(WONW) 
(in.) 
0,095 0,085 0,08 0,085 
Planing Link Spring Length 
Inside Washers 
(WONW) 
(in.) 
3,23 3,26 3,25 3,26 
WONW Aircraft Weight At 
Time Of Measurement 
(lbs) 
26 900  29 200  
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Table A10.  Landing Gear Rigging Measurements (Prototype) 
 
Prototype  Parameter 
Pre Flight Test Post Flight Test 
Location LH RH LH RH 
Connecting Link Length 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
6.5540 6.5595 6.5570 6.5665 
Pinhead Gap 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
0.3490 0.3585 0.3175 0.3490 
Gap Between Bell Cranks 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
0.1855 0.2105 0.1470 0.1840 
Planing Link Spring Length Inside 
Washers 
(WOFFW) 
(in.) 
3.4740 3.5395 3.4505 3.4885 
Planing Arm Spring Length From 
Base Including Retaining Cap 
(in.) 
6.8300 6.8500 6.8300 6.8500 
Hold Down Torque 0" (Fully      
Compressed) MLG Shock Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
114 161 110 124 
Planing Link Spring Length 0" 
(Fully Compressed) MLG Shock 
Stroke (in.) 
3.2295 3.2605 3.2085 3.2545 
Hold Down Torque 4" MLG Shock 
Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
108 
112 
145 
148 
108 
104 
113 
113 
Planing Link Spring Length 4" 
MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 
3.2600 
3.2475 
3.3045 
3.2860 
3.2380 
3.2400 
3.2854 
3.2760 
Hold Down Torque 6" MLG Shock 
Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
104 
110 
130 
138 
103 
104 
114 
112 
Planing Link Spring Length6" 
MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 
3.2875 
3.2770 
3.3355 
3.3145 
3.2640 
3.2545 
3.3080 
3.3075 
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Table A10.  Continued 
 
Prototype  Parameter 
Pre Flight Test Post Flight Test 
Location LH RH LH RH 
Hold Down Torque 8" MLG 
Shock Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
92 
108 
112 
128 
96 
88 
103 
105 
  
Planing Link Spring Length 8" 
MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 
3.3245 
3.3210 
3.3785 
3.3545 
3.3300 
3.2845 
3.3510 
3.3540 
Hold Down Torque 12" MLG 
Shock Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
87 
104 
87 
117 
84 
89 
83 
83 
Planing Link Spring Length 
12" MLG Shock Stroke (in.) 
3.4435 
3.4450 
3.4855 
3.4825 
3.4160 
3.4265 
3.4500 
3.4790 
Hold Down Torque12.3" (Fully 
Extended) MLG Shock Stroke 
(ft-lbs) 
87 
87 
86 
90 
79 
79 
79 
79 
Planing Link Spring Length 
12.3" (Fully Extended) MLG 
Shock Stroke (in.) 
3.4740 
3.4805 
3.5395 
3.5160 
3.4460 
3.4400 
3.4860 
3.5125 
Pinhead Gap 
(WONW) 
(in.) 
0.2303 0.3115 0.2460 0.2690 
Gap Between Bell Cranks 
(WONW) 
(in.) 
0.1095 0.1270 0.0870 0.1020 
Planing Link Spring Length 
Inside Washers 
(WONW) 
(in.) 
3.1860 3.2160 3.1455 3.1710 
WONW Aircraft Weight At 
Time Of Measurement 
(lbs) 
32,9   30,6   
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  10,200 lbs 
Configuration: Baseline      
Phase: Takeoff and Gear Retraction    
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A12.  Landing Gear Loads During Takeoff and Retraction (Baseline) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  11,000 lbs 
Configuration: Prototype      
Phase: Takeoff and Gear Retraction    
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A13.  Landing Gear Loads During Takeoff and Retraction (Prototype) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  4,400 lbs 
Configuration: Baseline      Descent Rate: 668 fpm  
Phase: Full Stop Landing      Crab Angle: 1.5º 
         Roll Angle: -1º 
         Pitch Angle: 2.4º 
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A14.  Full Stop Landing (Baseline) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  5,100 lbs 
Configuration: Prototype      Descent Rate: 495 fpm  
Phase: Full Stop Landing      Crab Angle: 0º 
         Roll Angle: 2º 
         Pitch Angle: 4.9º 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A15.  Full Stop Landing (Prototype) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  2,100 lbs 
Configuration: Baseline      Descent Rate: 720 fpm  
Phase: Cable Arrestment    
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A16.  Cable Arrestment Landing (Baseline)
 55 
Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  3,600 lbs 
Configuration: Prototype      Descent Rate: 953 fpm  
Phase: Cable Arrestment    
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A17.  Cable Arrestment Landing (Prototype) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  9,200 lbs 
Configuration: Baseline      Descent Rate: 705 fpm  
Phase: Cable Overrun 
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A18.  Cable Overrun (Baseline)
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  3,100 lbs 
Configuration: Prototype      Descent Rate: 638 fpm  
Phase: Cable Overrun 
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A19.  Cable Overrun (Prototype) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  10,200 lbs 
Configuration: Baseline      Descent Rate: 818 fpm  
Phase: Touch Down 
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A20.  Loads at Touch Down (Baseline) 
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Aircraft: 188907 
 
Source:  Flight Test       Fuel Weight:  5,800 lbs 
Configuration: Prototype      Descent Rate: 818 fpm  
Phase: Touch Down 
 
 
Time (Local) 
Figure A21.  Loads at Touch Down (Prototype)
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Figure A22.  Shock Absorber Extension When Maximum Connecting Link Load 
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Figure A23.  Connecting Link Loads vs Side Brace Loads 
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Figure A24.  Planing Link Load in Function of Shock Absorber Load 
 63 
-0,8
-0,7
-0,6
-0,5
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
-80000-70000-60000-50000-40000-30000-20000-100000
Shock Absorber Load (lbs)
D
is
pl
a
ce
m
e
n
t (i
n
.
)
Baseline
Prototype
Bottomed in Compression
 
Figure A25.  Planing Link Stroke in Function of Shock Absorber Load 
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VITA 
 
 Mr Eric Grandmont is currently working for the Canadian Forces Aerospace 
Engineering Test Establishment as the Deputy Officer in Charge of Avionics and Crew 
Systems.  During the CF188 landing gear upgrade project, he fulfilled the roles of 
project officer, flight test engineer and flight test control room mission commander.  Mr. 
Grandmont graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada in 2000 with a 
Mechanical Engineering Degree.  He then graduated from the renowned U.S. Naval 
Test Pilot School in 2006 as part of Class 129.  He has worked on numerous CF188 
projects as flight test engineer and on crew systems related projects as the senior crew 
systems engineer. 
